Game theory on networks

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Game theory on networks is a field that studies strategy in competing interest interactions among rational or adaptive players that are affected by the topology of networks.[1] This contains concepts from game theory, nonlinear dynamics, and graph theory to analyze behavioral player-player phenomena like cooperation, and collective behavior as well as competition and percolation in networked systems.[2][3]

This field has applications in areas such as economics, computer science, biology, and engineering, where players (nodes) interact through network connections (edges) instead of fully homogeneously mixed populations.[4]

Overview

[edit | edit source]

Typical models in game theory assume that all players interact with every other player in a well-mixed population that is homogeneous.[5] However, in networked game theory, nodes are limited to interact only through edges to other neighboring nodes.[1] In these networks, each node denotes an unique player while each edge denotes a path through which interactions are possible. These can be represented by payoff matrices that quantify utilities of different competing strategies.[6]

Furthermore, topological features (e.g. degree distribution, clustering, modularity, centrality) in networks can be studied in game theory settings, which may change the evolution, stability, and equilibria of strategies and therefore players.[3]

Mathematical formulation

[edit | edit source]

Consider a network G=(V,E) with N=|V| nodes and with an adjacency matrix A=[Aij].[4] Each node iV denotes a unique player with a strategy si chosen from a set of strategies Si. The payoff for node i is:[5]

ui(si,𝐬𝒩i)=j𝒩iAijP(si,sj)

where P(si,sj) is some payoff function pairwise between node i each of its neighbors, 𝒩i.[1]

A Nash equilibrium of a network is a collection of strategies for each player 𝐬*=(s1*,,sN*) such that[5] ui(si*,si*)ui(si,si*)i,siSi.

Evolutionary dynamics

[edit | edit source]

In evolutionary networked game theory, each node's strategy changes over time based on its payoff relative to its neighbors.[1] Let xi(t) be the probability that node i uses strategy si. The replicator dynamics in this network are:[5]

x˙i=xi(1xi)[Πis1Πis2],

Πis1=jAijP(s1,sj),Πis2=jAijP(s2,sj).

These dynamics are the networked population version of the classical replicator equation for well-mixed populations.[2]

x˙=x(1x)[Πs1Πs2],

One often-used structure updating mechanism is the Fermi rule:[1]

Pr(ij)=11+e(ΠjΠi)/K,

where K controls the level of randomness in the imitation process, which is reminiscent of the Boltzmann distribution.[6] In this way, we can compare game theory dynamics to statistical mechanics models.[3]

Spectral and topological effects

[edit | edit source]

The graph Laplacian, L=DA (where D is the degree matrix), can be used to determine specific characteristics of the node dynamics.[3] Linearizing the networked replicator dynamics around an equilibrium yields:[1] 𝐱˙=LW𝐱,

where W logs the payoff gradients for local neighbors. The eigenvalues of L (especially the algebraic connectivity λ2(L)) can be used to calculate rates of convergence and the equilibrium stability.[4] Networks with a modular structure may exhibit slow strategy transition or extremely stable cooperative clusters, which is similar to phenomena observed in spin systems and synchronization.[3]

Network formation games

[edit | edit source]

For network formation games, players can decide to form or delete links in order to strategically maximize utility.[4] If creating a link creates a cost c and yields benefit bij, a player's payoff can be written as:[4]

ui(G)=jbijcki,

where ki is the node's degree. A network G* is pairwise stable if:[4]

ui(G*)ui(G*ij)andui(G*+ij)<ui(G*) or uj(G*+ij)<uj(G*).

Models like these can explain the natural formation of social, economic, and communication networks as being the equilibrium outcomes of decentralized optimization.[4]

Applications

[edit | edit source]

Game theory in network science has applications in many fields.[6]

  • economics - modeling competition and cooperation in trade networks[4]
  • biology - modeling evolution of inter- or intra-species cooperation, and host–parasite interactions[2]
  • computer science - distributed algorithms, routing, and cybersecurity[3]
  • sociology - opinion dynamics, cultural evolution, and collective behavior[6]
  • engineering - resource allocation in energy networks[3]

There are many current areas of research [6] that include the following. Multi-layer and temporal networks are games played on multiplex topologies.[3] Quantum game theory, which is the application of quantum information to strategic interactions on networks.[1] Learning and reinforcement dynamics which covers machine learning in evolutionary games.[6] Control and optimization, which means designing network structures to create desired equilibria[4]

Theoretical challenges include extending equilibrium concepts to non-stationary networks and developing scalable analytical approximations.[5] In nonlinear dynamics, it is also a large question of how to link microscopic dynamics to macroscopic observables.[3]

See also

[edit | edit source]

References

[edit | edit source]
  1. ^ a b c d e f g Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2172: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  2. ^ a b c Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2172: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2172: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2172: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  5. ^ a b c d e Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2172: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  6. ^ a b c d e f Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2172: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).